Syracuse University

SURFACE
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone
Projects

Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone
Projects

Spring 5-1-2009

The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Regional Firms
Hyejoon Yoon

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Yoon, Hyejoon, "The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Regional Firms" (2009). Syracuse University
Honors Program Capstone Projects. 475.
https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/475

This Honors Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Syracuse University Honors Program
Capstone Projects at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone
Projects by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

I. INTRODUCTION
There have been major audit failures involving the largest companies such as
Enron, WorldCom and Tyco. As a result of these audit failures, Arthur Andersen no
longer exists and the audit failures have raised serious concerns about audit quality.
In order to prevent future potential audit failures, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was
passed in 2002 to establish enhanced standards for oversight of accounting
professionals, including U.S. public company boards, management, and public
accounting firms. In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act limits consulting services
performed by CPA firms to improve auditor independence.
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, there was increased attention on
major public accounting firms regarding audit quality, audit pricing, independence,
risk assessment, and legal liabilities. Research conducted by Hoitash, Markelevich,
and Barragato found that the quality of audits has improved and the price of audits
increased following the passage of the Act. Public companies have been restricted
from utilizing their own accounting firms for such services as advisory and some tax
services. In order to maintain their independence, three of the four major accounting
firms sold their consulting practices, even though consulting practices are again
growing rapidly. Interestingly, however, there has been little research focusing on
the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private companies and smaller audit firms.
Given the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study examines whether the effects
of the Act extend to private companies and their audit firms in the Central New York
market.

II. BACKGROUND
The accounting profession has been challenged with independence issues
and the quality of audits. Audit quality concerns have been raised dramatically since
the increasing number of audit failures from the largest audit firms in the early
2000s. Because public accounting firms play major roles in ascertaining the validity
and reliability of financial information, the quality of audits is important to
shareholders, stockholders, and internal management teams. The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission expressed its concern about potential audit independence
issues arising from non-audit services. Many researchers have conducted studies of
the relation between measures of audit quality and auditor independence.
A. Audit Quality
The term “audit quality” is not easily defined, and audit quality can be
defined from different perspectives. Epstein and Geiger (1994) find that auditors are
considered to be the highest level of assurance for investors. Over 70% of investors
expect no material misstatements or fraud in financial statements examined by
independent auditors. On the other hand, auditors strive to provide high quality
audits to avoid litigation, limit negative reputation effects, and maximize client
satisfaction. Two measures of audit quality are audit firm size and the knowledge
and skills of the members of the audit team.
Audit Firm Size
DeAngelo (1981) asserted larger audit firms provided higher quality audits
to maintain their reputation. The perception of larger audit firms providing higher
quality audits plays a major role in attracting and attaining clients. In order to obtain

a great reputation, larger firms invested in developing extensive control systems so
that their audit quality performances were the best possible. The better and updated
technologies used in Big Four audit firms detect going concern issues more
accurately, which results in an aggressive stance in issuing the appropriate opinion
(Wooten, 2003). DeAngelo also argued that larger audit firms have higher audit
quality because of their greater level of independence, which will be discussed later
in the paper.
Another measure of audit quality is litigation outcomes. Palmrose (1988)
examined 472 legal cases from 1960 to 1985. She found that the larger accounting
firms were less often involved in litigation compared to non-Big Four audit
companies. Palmrose concluded that the lower amount of litigation against large
audit firms was due to their higher audit quality.

Wooten (2003) drew the

relationship that less litigation exposure generates more wealth for clients, and also
provides justification for Big Four audit firms to charge a premium fee. The
premium fee allows larger firms to provide more incentives and benefits to attract
skilled employees.
Audit Team
Carcello, Hermanson, and McGarth (1992) emphasized the important role of
audit teams in providing high audit quality.

Partners and managers focus on

supervising staff members, reviewing, and signing off on important workpapers.
The attention provided by partners and managers helps ensure high audit quality.
For instance, Tommy O’Connell was a senior auditor in charge of a project at the
Altamesa Manfacturing facility.

When an inexperienced staff auditor, Carl

Wilmeth, handed in his work incomplete, O’Connell had to spend extra hours
tracking down missing invoices and late confirmations. The premature signoff
became a concern in this case due to the time pressure and the limited budget;
however, there was no litigation involved. The Tommy O’Connell case illustrates
the important role of managers and partners as reviewers of work completed by
inexperienced staff members.
As Houghton and Fogarty found in their research, many inherent errors
were detected in the early stage. In order to identify errors before the actual audit
starts, auditors’ knowledge and experience are critical. Auditors with greater
industry knowledge provide more accurate assessments of inherent risk that are
critical to designing effective audit plans.
B. Auditor Independence
Even though auditing remains the largest practice unit of audit firms,
consulting services and tax services on average contributed 32% and 22%,
respectively to firms’ revenues in 2008 (Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz, 2008). A
large portion of the auditor fee comes from non-audit services. Some argue that the
magnitude of non-audit fees could cause a reduction in auditor independence.
Fee Sources and Independence in Appearance
The large profits generated by non-audit services could negatively impact
audit firm independence.

In order to enhance the independence of the audit

function, keeping auditors independent to all users is important by avoiding any
situations that lead outsiders to doubt auditors’ independence (Burton, 1980).
Because of the auditor independence appearance concerns, in 2002 Walt Disney,

Inc. declared that it would refuse to buy any non-audit services from the accounting
firm that audits its financial statements (Glater, 2002). The concern is that auditors
might go easy on a client that is paying a large amount of consulting fees. For
example, when Enron went bankrupt, the question occurred because Enron paid
Andersen $25 million for its audit, while the consulting services cost $27 million
(Glater, 2002).
As a result of Enron and other alleged audit failures, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
was signed in 2002. Section 201 clearly restricts many non-audit services provided
by accounting firms to audit clients. Even though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits
bookkeeping, legal services, or actuarial services, it does not completely prohibit
consulting services. In the period leading up to Enron’s collapse, Big 4 audit firms
started to separate their consulting businesses. For instance, Ernst & Young sold its
consulting services to Cap Gemini, and KPMG shed its consulting through a public
stock offering.
Since the major role of auditors is providing assurance to investors, the
quality of audits helps determine whether a company will be able to avoid
litigation, limit negative reputation effects, and maximize client satisfaction.
Larger audit companies tend to provide a higher quality of audits to maintain their
positive reputation and retain their clients. In addition, if an audit team is
knowledgeable of the industry, there are more accurate predictions of inherent
risks, which lead to higher quality of audits. Auditor independence is another
component to determine the audit quality. The more independent audit companies

are, the higher the audit quality. In order to maintain independence, non-audit
services provided by audit companies are strongly prohibited.
C. Enron
Between 2000 and 2002, a series of large corporate frauds occurred due to a
variety of complex factors that created the conditions and culture for fraud. Enron
Creditors Recovery Corporation (Enron) was an American leading energy company
based in Houston, Texas. It employed approximately 22,000 (McLean & Elkind,
2003) and Fortune magazine named Enron as “America’s Most Innovative
Company” for six consecutive years in the 1990s. In late 2001, a financial scandal
involving Enron and its accounting firm Arthur Andersen was revealed.
In 2000, Enron reported revenue of $101 billion. Enron was able to boost its
revenues because the Congress of the United States of America passed legislation
deregulating the sale of electricity and natural gas in the early 1990s. By creating
special purpose entities, Enron was able to avoid taxes and raise the profitability of
the business. Creating special purpose entities such as Bob West Treasure, Jedi, and
Hawaii gave Enron the freedom to move currency and anonymity so that losses of
the company could be taken off the balance sheet, which made Enron look more
profitable than it actually was. As a result, it created a spiral each quarter so that
officers needed to create the illusion of billions in profits while the company was
actually facing losses. Even though executives and investors knew about the
offshore accounts, they continued insider Enron stock trading that was worth
millions of dollars.

In November 1999, Enron launched EnronOnline, an Internet-based
transaction system, that permitted buyers and sellers to buy, sell, and trade products
globally. In order to create a user-friendly website, EnronOnline operated just like a
stock ticker that allowed participants to see prices on their screen. Natural gas and
electricity were the most common commodities traded in EnronOnline. Because
Enron was not involved with buying, selling, or trading in every transaction, it used
the mark-to-mark accounting method, which calculates the value of financial
instruments held based on the current market price. With the technology boom,
Enron was able to manipulate the price of its stock on Wall Street and recorded
gains from what could have been losses.
The concerns of the company started to rise on August 14, 2001, when
Jeffrey Skilling, the chief executive of Enron, announced his resignation after only
six months with the firm. Skilling sold 450,000 Enron shares worth $33 million.
Kenneth Lay, the chairman at Enron, announced there was “absolutely no
accounting issue, no trading issue, no reserve issue, no previously unknown problem
issues” involved in Skilling’s departure. Furthermore, Lay reassured investors that
there would be “no changes in the performance or outlook of the company going
forward” (Lay, 2001). In the New York Times, Paul Krugman attacked Enron as an
illustration of the consequences of the deregulation and commoditization of energy.
With the falling stock prices, Enron announced a loss in the third-quarter in
2001. The executives explained the losses were caused by investment losses and
other losses in their core energy businesses. When the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission announced its investigation of Enron’s suspicious deals, the share price

of Enron fell from $20.65 to $5.40 in one day, on October 22, 2001. The Enron
executives announced their full participation in the investigation to clear up any
concerns of their transactions.
In November 2001, Enron executives started looking for new investment or
a buyout. Enron management was able to find Dynergy, another energy company
based in Houston, TX. On November 8, 2001, Dynergy and Enron made a deal for
Dynergy to provide Enron $2.5 billion in cash. A couple of days after the deal,
Enron announced its plan to sell $8 billion worth of underperforming assets.
Even with these optimistic plans, Dynergy disengaged from the acquisition.
In addition to the disengagement, Enron’s credit rating was slightly above the lowest
level and the company had $23 billion in liabilities. On December 1, 2001, Enron
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As a result of the bankruptcy, Arthur Andersen’s
audits were receiving attention.
On June 15, 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of shredding Enron
related documents as an obstruction of justice. As a result of this conviction, Arthur
Andersen agreed to surrender its Certified Public Accountant licenses. It was
questioned whether Arthur Andersen maintained its integrity and independence from
its audit client, which paid $25 million for its audit but $27 million in consulting
service fees (Glater 2002). Although the Supreme Court of the United States
overturned Andersen’s conviction, Arthur Andersen was not able to recover from
the negative impact on its reputation. With Arthur Andersen’s downfall, there are
only four big accounting firms.

D. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In response to a number of major corporate and accounting scandals, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act, was signed on July 30, 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
combined the accounting reform bills of Senator Sarbanes and Representative
Oxley. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains 11 titles, which specify mandatory
requirements in reporting financial statements. A key provision of the SarbanesOxley Act is the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) in Title I. In order to provide independent oversight of public accounting
firms that offer audit services, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the PCAOB. The
PCAOB establishes standards for auditing, ethics, independence, and quality control
for public company audits, and it inspects the quality of audit firms.
Title II emphasizes independence of external auditors to limit conflicts of
interest. It requires audit partner rotation every five years, auditor reporting
requirements, and new auditor approval requirements. Title II restricts public
accounting firms from providing non-audit services to their clients, including
bookkeeping services, financial information systems design and implementation,
valuation services, investment advising, legal services, and any other services that
the Board determines are impermissible.
Corporate responsibility is listed in Title III to enhance the accuracy and
completeness of corporate financial reports. The company’s principal officers, such
as the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer, are obligated to certify
and review the annual reports to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial

matters. Furthermore, it specifies the limits of the specific forfeitures of benefits,
civil penalties for non-compliance, and the interaction of external auditors and
corporate audit committees.
Title IV focuses more on enhancing reporting requirements for financial
transactions, especially an emphasis on the importance of periodic reports and
disclosures. It requires the financial statement issuers to disclose the adoption of a
code of ethics for senior financial officers and adequate reasons if the code of ethics
has been omitted. Furthermore, the rule requires that the company disclose if its
audit committee does not have at least one financial expert to ensure the quality of
financial statements. Section 404 of Title IV requires auditors to report on
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls. According to
many previous research studies, this requirement resulted in a substantial increase in
audit fees.
Unlike other titles, Title V only consists of one section, which defines the
codes of conduct for securities analysis and requires disclosure of conflicts of
interest. In order to restore investor confidence in securities analysis, Title VI
emphasizes authorization of appropriations and appearance and practice before the
commission. Identifying inappropriate professional conduct made clear what results
in a violation of professional standards.
Title VII narrates the various studies conducted and their findings. The
study fields include credit rating agencies, report violations, investment banking and
enforcement actions. These findings prove the importance of consolidation of public

accounting firms and the role of credit rating agencies in the operation of securities
markets.
Title VIII explains the accountability in corporate and criminal frauds. It
describes punishments and penalties due to criminal manipulation, destruction and
alternation of financial records. In addition to Title VIII, Title IX describes the
possible consequences of white collar crimes. It suggests enhanced sentencing
guidelines such as a fine up to $5,000,000 and imprisonment up to 20 years.
Title X simply requires the Chief Executive Officer to sign the company’s
tax returns. Lastly, Title XI describes corporate fraud accountability. It gives the
power to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to freeze large or unusual
payments made by companies temporarily. In addition, the SEC can prohibit certain
people from serving as an officer of a public company due to previous fraud
attempts. As a result, Title XI increases criminal penalties under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its enhanced new procedures changed the
relations between many U.S. companies and their investors. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act has been praised for improving investor confidence and providing more accurate
and reliable financial statements. By prohibiting auditors from having a consulting
agreement with the audit client, Section 201 addresses potential auditor conflicts of
interest. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox believes, “Sarbanes-Oxley helped restore
confidence in U.S. markets by increasing accountability, speeding up reporting, and
making audits more independent” (Cox, 2007). Due to the law’s restrictions, there
were 1,295 restatements of financial earnings in 2005 among companies listed on

U.S. securities markets, which was double the amount from 2004. These
restatements show that previous audit reports were inaccurate or materially
misstated. Therefore, the SEC subcommittee believes the restatement should
include facts such as how it was discovered, why it occurred, and corrective actions
that were taken by the company to prevent the error in the future (SEC, 2007). After
announcing restatements, 60 percent of restating firms face a turnover of a top
executive within 24 months, which leads to a negative reputation and lowering the
total earnings of the firm (Desai, Hogan and Wilkins, 2006). Despite a few praises
regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there are many criticisms as well. Congressman
Ron Paul believes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “damaged American capital markets by
providing an incentive for small U.S. firms and foreign firms to deregister from U.S.
stock exchanges” (Paul, 2004). According to Wharton Business School research,
there were only 10 new foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange in 2004,
and many companies decided to deregister after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. On
December 21, 2008, the Wall Street Journal criticized “the new laws and regulations
have neither prevented frauds nor instituted fairness. But they have managed to kill
the creation of new public companies in the U.S., cripple the venture capital
business, and damage entrepreneurship” (Wall Street Journal, 2008).
F. Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act not only provides for confidence in financial
statements, it increases legal liability of accountants. In the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act
era, auditors faced liability only when a client company collapsed. Nevertheless,
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, auditors can potentially face legal consequences for a

failure in a PCAOB inspection. The regulation by the PCAOB changed the audit
regulatory system. As a result, auditors can be suspended, terminated or sentenced
to 20 years in prison for purposefully destroying documents. Furthermore, an
auditor’s wrongful actions prohibit the auditor from performing audits of public
companies (Wegman, 2005).
The major finding in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act era is the increase in audit
fees. Among the S&P 500 companies, the audit fee increased 27% from 2001 to
2002, 24% from 2002 to 2003 (Foley and Lardner, 2004), and 55% from 2003 to
2004 (Foley and Lardner, 2005). In addition, between 2001 and 2004, total audit
and audit-related fees increased 103% for 496 companies from the S&P 500
companies. One of the causes for the fee increase is internal control reporting under
Section 404. The report on internal controls requires a new set of procedures and
related costs to the standard audit. According to the CEO of Deloitte USA, the
firm’s clients experienced audit fee increases of approximately 40 percent from 2003
to 2004 (Whitehouse, 2005). These dramatic increases in costs are mainly due to
additional work imposed upon clients.
Despite the increase in audit fees, some local and regional audit firms
discontinued performing SEC audits after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed. In
2002 and 2003, 25 out of the 47 audit firms that participated in a research study
ceased SEC audit work. In total, about 7 percent of small audit firms ceased SEC
audits. The primary reason for leaving the public company audit market was the
oversight process of the PCAOB. The second primary factor given for leaving the
market was availability and cost of liability insurance in the post Sarbanes-Oxley

Act era. After ceasing the SEC audits, ten responders are not expecting any decline
in their revenue because they are planning to offer other services to their clients. On
the other hand, eighteen firms are expecting to experience a 5 to 20 percent loss in
their revenue (Read, Rama, and Raghunandan, 2004).
Regardless of ceasing SEC audits and expecting to provide more “other
services,” from 2001 to 2004, accounting firms experienced a major decrease in “all
other fees,” which include fees for financial systems design and implementation.
One of the major reasons, however, is due to the selling off of consulting services.
Starting from 2003, auditing became a major source of revenue for accounting firms
due to the additional responsibility of signing off on internal control systems.
Accounting firms reported eighty-two percent of their audit-firm billings are
generated by auditing. Despite the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act banned
accounting firms from providing non-auditing services, these firms can still offer
these services to non-audit clients (Ciesielski, 2006).
Due to these impacts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I am interested in finding
the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private and local firms. In
particular, I investigate perceived changes in fees and quality in the local audit
market after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

III. METHOD
A. Survey Instrument
The first phase of the study involved developing specific questions that
relate to audit quality, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and audit pricing. Audit quality

and pricing were two key elements identified from reviewing the articles and
literature, especially DeAngelo. In order to obtain information related to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, current articles and newspapers were used to broaden my
understanding.
Questions were developed to determine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on regional companies, concentrated in the Central New York area.
Questions were aimed at determining whether the company used Big Four or local
accounting firms to audit their financial statements. If their financial statements
are not audited by auditors, another question followed asking whether financial
statements were reviewed by an accounting firm. A review provides less
assurance than an audit on the fairness of the financial statements. Some
questions were designed to determine the changes in perceived audit quality, audit
fees, and auditor independence due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Additional
questions addressed the level of satisfaction with the audit services to assess
whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has positively affected audit quality in the local
audit market.
There have been numerous research studies done to determine how public
companies and major accounting firms have reacted to the change in accounting
rules. Nevertheless, due to limited access to information, the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private companies has not been widely studied.
Therefore, the main intention from the questionnaire is to gather the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private companies in one local market.

The questionnaire contains 19 attributes, which rate client satisfaction with
the auditor, as well as the auditor’s knowledge. Survey participants were asked to
evaluate the degree of impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on their company. If
there was a change in accounting firm within the last 5 years, the questionnaire
asked about the reason for the change in auditors. In addition, questions
addressed the level of audit quality, audit and other fees, and the knowledge of the
accounting firms to determine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The audit
quality attributes included in the questionnaire, and the scale responses format,
are presented in the Appendix. Out of these 19 questions, 15 questions are
qualitative while only four questions focused on quantitative data such as audit
and non-audit services fees. Qualitative questions were designed to find the
changes in audit quality, service satisfaction, and independence. Quantitative
questions were designed to measure how much these local companies spent on
audit and non-audit services for fiscal year 2007.
The second phase of the survey involved sending out the actual survey
questionnaires. A total of 112 surveys were sent to advertising agencies,
architectural firms, banks, building supply companies, and commercial builders
industries on September 26, 2008. Surveys were sent to 168 commercial builders,
commercial printing companies, credit unions, cultural and performing art
organizations, durable medical equipment suppliers, and employment benefit
consultant industries on October 3, 2008. The first response was received on
September 30, 2008 and the last response was received on January 6, 2009.

Responses to 126 out of 429 questionnaires were received over a 15-week period.
The response rate of approximately 29% is typical of survey research.
B. Participants
Questionnaires were sent to the Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial
Officers, or the president of companies. The names and addresses of these
officers were obtained from Business Journal: Central New York, Book of List
2008. Among the 52 industries included in this publication, 17 industries were
selected based on the size of the industry. These industries are: advertising
agencies, architectural firms, banks, building supply companies, commercial
builders, commercial printing companies, credit unions, cultural and performing
art organizations, durable medical equipment suppliers, employment benefit
consultants, employment placement agencies, engineering firms, environmental
consulting firms, law firms, residential builders, software developers, and webdesign and development firms.

IV. HYPOTHESIS
A. Level of Audit Fees
Due to increases in effort and resource constraints, there was a significant
increase in audit fees after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. In the
post the Sarbanes-Oxley era, it is mandatory for publicly traded companies to
have their financial statements and effectiveness of internal control audited by
public accounting firms (Ettredge, Li and Scholz, 2007).

In order to keep the audit fee stable, clients who used a Big 4 auditor may
substitute smaller or lower cost auditors. These clients that change their auditors
appear to be small enough to feasibly hire a non-Big 4 auditor to continuously
audit their financial statements. This dismissal is in favor of either a national or a
regional auditor. In 2006, PricewaterhouseCoopers announce that it experienced
fee increases; however, there will be cost savings, efficiencies and assessment
requirements because auditors and clients gained experience with post-SarbanesOxley Act audits.
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not apply to private companies, it
created a large increase in audit demand that likely affected the entire industry. As
a result, even private companies likely experienced increased audit fees. The first
hypothesis addresses the effect of the Act on audit fees.
H1A:

Private companies experienced an increase in audit fees due to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

DeAngelo found that audit fees are lower for initial audit engagements to
attract clients, but auditors may reduce the extent of audit procedures
commensurate with the lower audit fee. Changing auditors for the client is costly,
so the lower fee compensates clients for switching auditors. In addition,
DeAngelo argues that the auditors earn a quasi-rent stream in later years for
lowering their initial audit bids. Even though clients can maintain low audit fees
by constantly changing auditors, it might affect their reputation and cost in a startup investment relationships.

On the basis of the preceding discussion, I state the following hypothesis:
H1B:

The increase in audit fees will be lower for companies that
changed auditors over the past five years compared to companies
that did not change auditors.

B. Level of Audit Quality
Integrity and objectivity are a part of the profession’s ability to enhance
auditor independence. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) requires auditors to “retain their integrity and objectivity in all phases of
their practices and, when expressing opinions on financial statements, avoid
involvement in situations that would impair the credibility of their independence”
(28) and it is discussed in the Professional Ethics Executive Committee Meetings.
DeAngelo (1981) argued larger audit firms have greater independence because each
client is immaterial to the company. Immateriality makes the audit firms resist client
pressure. On the other hand, DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002)
indicated one of regulators’ concerns is that auditors may be willing to sacrifice
independence to retain clients that pay large auditor fees. These researchers were
able to examine the association between non-audit services and auditor
independence. Contrary to DeAngelo’s argument, DeFond’s research suggested that
fees could potentially influence the auditor’s independence by creating an economic
bond.
The lower fees for initial audit engagements are a possible result from
lowballing. Deis and Giroux (1992, 1996) found that there was higher audit

quality on initial audit engagements in the government sector. Even though these
research studies related to the governmental sector found evidence of higher audit
quality for initial audit engagements, I believe lower costs are the result of less
audit hours spent by audit teams, which could possibly lower the audit quality.
Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard provided a reason for audit fee increases
regardless of whether internal control problems were disclosed by public
companies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They concluded that auditors
increased testing to address control problems. Auditors are assessing the
possibilities of risks that were not previously disclosed under control problems.
Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato conducted the research during the period
2000-2003 to find the relationship between total fees and audit quality over years.
The research time period is very interesting because there were sweeping changes
in the accounting professional environment. They claimed that increases in total
fees will enhance auditor independence, which will lead to an increase in audit
quality. Therefore, I state the following hypothesis.
H2: The level of audit quality will increase as the level of audit fees
increases.

C. Client Satisfaction
I am also interested in finding whether the client’s satisfaction with the
audit quality provided by the audit firm depends on the accounting firm’s industry
knowledge, familiarity with the client’s internal control, client’s industry, and the
valuable suggestions provided to management.

Daugherty and Tervo used S&P 500 companies to find the relationship
between auditor changes and client satisfaction. They found that a recent change
in auditors reduces the respondent’s satisfaction level with the professional
services provided by the auditor compared to respondents not experiencing a
change. In addition, they found there are no differences in client satisfaction
regardless of the level of audit fees. One the other hand, some studies found that
the audit fee is one of the significant drivers of client satisfaction. As the result of
the loss of Arthur Andersen, the number of ‘Big’ audit firms has declined, while
the number of publicly traded companies stayed constant. Therefore, clients have
lost the leverage to select their audit firms. Due to higher audit fees and reduction
in the number of large audit firms, client satisfaction is a daunting task
(Daugherty and Tervo, 2005).
Carcello et al. (1992) used 653 sample responses from Fortune 1000
companies to examine important factors in determining audit quality. Their
research reported the four most critical factors for high audit quality: the
experience of the audit team, auditor experience and knowledge in the industry,
responsiveness to client needs and compliance with the general audit standards.
Industry specialization on audit engagements enhances the quality of audit. They
found that the audit team and firm experience with the client is the most important
factor in determining audit quality.
Some researchers argue that “the price of the service can greatly influence
perceptions of quality, satisfaction, and value. Because services are intangible
and are often difficult to judge before purchase, price is frequently relied on as a

surrogate indicator that will influence quality expectations and perceptions”
(Zeithaml and Bitner, 2000). Behn, Carcello and Hermmanson (1997) examined
the relationship between audit quality attributes and client satisfaction. They
found that client satisfaction with the audit team has a positive relationship with
the audit fee paid by Fortune 1000 clients. Based on previous studies, I state the
following hypotheses.
H3A:

The client’s satisfaction with the accounting firm will increase
with the accounting firm’s knowledge of the client’s internal
control and ability to provide valuable suggestions.

H3B: The client’s satisfaction with the accounting firm will decrease
with the level of audit fees.
These research hypotheses will be examined using both univariate tests
and multivariate models that control for other factors that impact audit quality,
client satisfaction, and audit fees.

V. Model Development
To test the hypotheses, three regression models are used to examine the
impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on regional firms. In order to measure different
effects of qualitative data, a logistic model is used in this research. It is a
regression model for ordinal dependent variables measuring categorical variables.
The following dependent variables are examined: (1) the change in the level of
audit fees, (2) the level of audit quality, and (3) client satisfaction.

A. Fee Model
The first model is designed to find the relationship between the change in
the level of audit fees and certain audit attributes. The control variables that are
used in this model are based on previous research related to audit fees, quality,
and satisfaction. The model for the perceived change in the level of audit fees is
as follows (variables are defined in table 1):
LEVELAFEE = b0 + b1 FSAPUB + b2 FSREV + b3 INTAUD + b4
CHANGE5YR + b5 AMTHRS + b6 QUALITYA + b7
SATWQUAL + b8 0NONE +b9 1TAX +b10 2CONS + b11
3BOOK + b12 4OTHER+ ε
B. Quality Model
The second model represents the change in audit quality provided by
independent accounting firms. This model used the same variables except
QUALITYA is the dependent variable instead of LEVELAFEE. The following is
the estimated logistical regression:
QUALITYA = b0 + b1 FSAPUB + b2 FSREV + b3 INTAUD + b4
CHANGE5YR + b5 AMTHRS + b6 LEVELAFEE + b7
SATWQUAL + b8 0NONE +b9 1TAX +b10 2CONS + b11
3BOOK + b12 4OTHER+ ε
C. Perceived Satisfaction Model
The third model reflects client satisfaction with the audit services provided
by the accounting firm. QUALITYA, AMTHRS and LEVELAFEE are not used
in this model because these three variables measure changes. Instead,

INTCONTRL, INDUST, and VALUSUGGEST are used to enhance the
relationship of the regression model. For the measure of satisfaction, I estimated
the following logistical regression:
SATWQUAL = b0 + b1 FSAPUB + b2 FSREV + b3 INTAUD + b4
YEARSACCFIRM + b5 CHANGE5YR + b6 0NONE + b7
1TAX + b8 2CONS +b9 3BOOK +b104OTHER + b11
INTCONTRL+ b12 INDUST+ b13VALUSUGGEST + ε
Model variables are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Summary of variables
Dependent variable, measured on a 5-point scale
Name
Construct or Concept measured
LEVELAFEE
The level of audit fees change
QUALITYA
The change in audit quality provided by the accounting firm
Dependent variable, measured on a 10-point scale
Name
Construct or Concept measured
SATWQUHL
Client satisfaction with the quality of audit firm
Independent variables, measured dichotomously
Construct or Concept measured
Name
FSAPUB
Financial statements audited by a public accounting firm
FSREV
Financial statements reviewed by an accounting firm
INTAU
Internal audit function in the company
0NONE
Not utilizing any other services provided by the accounting firm
1TAX
Utilizing tax service provided by the accounting firm
2CONS
Utilizing consulting service provided by the accounting firm
3BOOK
Utilizing bookkeeping service provided by the accounting firm
4OTHER
Utilizing other service provided by the accounting firm
Independent variables, measured on a 5-point scale
Construct or Concept measured
Name
AMTHRS
The amount of audit hours spent by the accounting firm

Independent variables, measured on a 10-point scale
Construct or Concept measured
Name
INTCONTRL
Accounting firm's knowledge and familiarity with client's internal control
INDUST
Accounting firm's knowledge of the client's industry
VALUSUGGES Valuable suggestions provided by the accounting firm
Other independent variables
Construct or Concept measured
Name
CHANGE5YR
Change of an accounting firm within last 5 years
OSERV
Other services utilizing from the accounting firm

D. Dependent Variables
In this research, three different variables measure the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on regional firms. These are the level of change in audit fee,
quality of audit, and client satisfaction.
The first dependent variable, LEVELAFEE, measures changes in audit
fees over the period. Given the nature of the study, the judgment of individuals
with knowledge and in a position to observe the changes in the audit fee is
required. Since 2002, S&P 500 companies experienced a major increase in the
audit fee due to additional work required such as the Section 404 report on
internal control (Foley and Lardner, 2005). Since private companies are not
required to follow the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its procedures, LEVELAFEE will
provide measure of how the market changes triggered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
have impacted local firms.
The second dependent variable, QUALITYA, is based on respondents’
perceptions of the change in audit quality provided by accounting firms after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. If the level of audit fee has increased after the SarbanesOxley Act, the quality of audits provided by accounting firms should also have

increased. An increase in total fees leads to an increase in audit quality because
the fee enhances auditor effort and audit independence (Hoitash, Markelevich and
Baragato, 2005). If clients have experienced a decrease in audit fee, it might be a
result from lowballiing, which lowers the level of audit quality (Deis and Giroux,
1992, 1996).
The last dependent variable, SATWQUHL, is also based on audit clients’
judgment and it captures client satisfaction with the audit quality that is provided
by an accounting firm on a level from one to ten. Zeithaml and Bitner (2000)
suggest that the audit fee will be the most influential factor of determining client
satisfaction because the audit service is intangible and is difficult to measure.
These dependent variables measure clients’ perceptions and capture
perceived audit fees, quality and satisfaction after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These
variables are subject to respondents’ opinion. Therefore, it moves beyond the
effect of the audit firm’s reputation on audit fees, quality and satisfaction.
E. Control Variables
The majority of the control variables used in this study are factors that
were identified as affecting audit fees, quality and satisfaction. These include
FSAPUB, FSREV, INTAUD, CHANG5YR, AMTHRS, 1TAX, 2CONS,
3BOOK, 4OTHER, INTCONTRL, INDUST and VALUSUGGE.
FSAPUB, FSREV and INTAUD are components determining whether a
company is audited or not. FSAPUB measures whether a company is audited by
a public accounting firm. If a company is not audited by a public accounting
firm, FSREV captures whether the company’s financial statements are reviewed

by any accounting firm. Having its own internal audit function (INTAUD) can
help a firm build a professional relationship with external auditors and investors.
The internal audit function can provide assurance to third parties as well. Hiring
an external auditor increases transparency for external investors and the
management team. External investors or third parties lack relevant information
about the value, performance, financial position, risk, and investment
opportunities of firms. A lack of reliable information creates asymmetry, which
can result in not maximizing investment policies and motivating employees
(Bushman and Smith, 2005).
CHANG5YR captures whether the client changed accounting firms after
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While local and regional audit firms are dropping SEC
clients, companies are also changing their auditors in order to reduce the audit fee
(Ettredge, 2007). After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, one of the main reasons for the
fee increase is due to Section 404, which requires auditors to spend more time
evaluating the internal control of a company (Whitehouse, 2002). Although
private companies are not subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Section 404,
overall changes in the audit environment after passage of the Act likely affected
the extent of audit testing on all engagements. AMTHRS measures the change of
audit hours spent by a client’s accounting firm.
Publicly traded companies are prohibited from using non-audit services
from their audit companies. Non-audit services are strongly forbidden in order to
maintain auditor independence (Burton, 1999). However, there is no such a
restriction on private companies. 1TAX, 2CONS, 3BOOK and 4OTHER

captures any non-audit services provided by external accounting firms to measure
the independence of audit firms and impact on the quality of audit provided.
The three control variables, INTCONTRL, INDUST and VALUSUGGE
are components of audit quality tested by Carcello et al. (1992). These variables
are main elements that enhance the quality of audit. Carcello et al. found that the
audit team’s familiarity with the client’s internal control, knowledge of the
industry, and responsiveness to the client are major factors determining the
quality of audit.

VI. RESULTS
A. Response Rate
The survey questionnaires were sent to 429 companies located around the
Central New York area, regardless of whether the company was private or public.
As shown in Table 2, among the 429 companies, 126 responses were received, a
29.4% response rate. Given the nature of the research, and the nature of the
companies contacted, the response rate is considered satisfactory.
TABLE 2
Sample Characteristics

Industry
Advertising agencies
Architectural firms
Banks
Building supply companies
Commercial builders
Commercial printing companies
Credit unions
Cultural & performing art organizations

Sample
Size
32
29
28
19
25
25
25
26

Usable
Responses
9
11
13
5
12
11
14
8

Response
Rate
28%
38%
46%
26%
48%
44%
56%
31%

Durable medical equipment suppliers
Employment benefit consultant
Employment placement agencies
Engineering firms
Environmental consulting firms
Law firms
Residential builders
Software developers
Web-design & development firms
Total

18
29
20
31
21
26
19
19
37
429

9
5
5
9
1
6
1
4
3
126

B. Market Share
Among the accounting firms listed in the survey questionnaire, the Firley,
Moran, Freer and Eassa, P.C. accounting firm has the greatest market share at
12%. Firley, Moran, Freer and Eassa, P.C. focuses on construction and real
estate, credit unions, energy, manufacturing, professional and business services,
and wholesale distribution/retail industries. Since the company was established in
1980, Firley, Moran, Freer and Eassa, P.C. concentrates on audit, tax, and
management consulting services in the Central New York region. Because of the
accountant’s provincial focus and closeness to their clientele, Firley, Moran, Freer
and Eassa captured a great portion of the market share. In addition, there is
substantial overlap in the industries surveyed and the industries on which Firley,
Moran, Freer, and Eassa focuses. This is another reason that Firley, Moran, Freer
and Eassa, P.C. has a great market share in the sample.
There is only a 7% total market share captured by Big 4 accounting firms
combined. Among the 7% market share, KPMG is the leading Big 4 accounting
company with a 5% market share. One of the major changes in the market share
of these Big 4 Accounting firms is due to the recent office relocation by

50%
17%
25%
29%
5%
23%
5%
21%
8%
29%

PricewaterhouseCoopers in March of 2007. Seven of the survey participants used
PricewaterhouseCoopers as their auditing firm; however, due to the closing of the
Syracuse office, these companies changed accounting firms. In contrast, even
though Ernst & Young has an office located in Mony Tower in downtown
Syracuse, only one survey participant utilized its services. The possible
explanation is due to the premium charged by Big 4 auditors. Craswell, Francis
and Taylor examined 1484 Australian public companies to estimate audit
premium earned by Big 8 auditors. They found, on average, industry specialist
Big 8 auditors charge a 34% premium compared to nonspecialist Big 8 auditors
due to industry specialization and brand recognition. In addition, they also found,
on average, Big 8 audit firms receive 30% brand premiums over non-Big 8
auditors.
Another possible reason for low market share obtained by Big 4 firms is
the scalability of Central New York companies. Many regional companies are
looking for regional firms that are familiar with the district’s business
characteristics or trends. Because these clients are mostly small to mid-size
companies and locally run, they do not see the necessity of paying the premium
due to an accounting firm’s reputation. Besides the 14 accounting firms listed,
Bonadio & Co. LLP, Evans & Bennett, Gustafson & Co., Kane, Bowles & Moor
PC, Sciarabba Walker & Co., and Vieria and Associates, CPA were other
accounting firms that provided services to more than two participants in this
survey. Table 3 shows the number of accounting firms used by survey
participants and their market share.

TABLE 3
Market Share

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Name of Accounting Firms
Beard Miller & Company
Bowers & Company
Dannible & McKee
Deloitte & Touche
Dermody, Burke & Brown
Ernst & Young
Fust Charles Chambers
Green & Seifter
Firley, Moran, Freer & Eassa
KPMG
Piaker & Lyons
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Sirchia & Cuomo, LLP
Testone Marshall & Discenza
Other:
Bonadio & Co. LLP
EFP Group
Evans & Bennett
Gustafson & Co.
Kane, Bowles & Moore PC
Mengel, Metzger, Barr & Co.
Rinemard Fitzgerald
Sciarabba Walker & Co.
Vieira and Associates, CPA

Number of Companies Utilizing
the Accounting Firm
6
5
4
1
5
1
4
4
15
6
3
0
0
4
63
2
2
2
2
4
3
2
5
2

Market Share
5%
4%
3%
1%
4%
1%
3%
3%
12%
5%
2%
0%
0%
3%
52%

C. Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample. The table
shows more than half of respondents are utilizing a public accounting firm to
audit their financial statements.

TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics – overall sample (N=126)

Variable
FS audited
FS reviewed
Internal audit

Dichotomous Variables
Mean
SD
0.59
0.49
0.94
0.24
0.56
0.50

Variable
Level audit fee
Amount audit hours
Quality of audit

Measured on a 5-point scale
Mean
SD
2.43
0.77
2.50
0.84
2.58
0.81

Variable
Quality satisfaction
Knowledgeable
Company industry
Suggestions

Measured on a 10-point scale
Mean
SD
8.31
1.73
8.43
1.76
7.88
2.02
7.92
2.07

Variable
Years with accounting firm
Total audit
Total tax
Total consulting
Other
Total other

Continuous and discrete variables
Mean
SD
Range
13.07
10.21
1-60
$98,640
$604,494
$400-5,000,000
$8,817
$13,047
$400-68,000
$4,674
$6,336
$300-23,179
$10,407
$17,879
$750-70,000
$60,351
$446,206
$300-5,010,000

Range
1-10
1-10
1-10
1-10

Of the companies that did not have an audit by a public accounting firm,
52 survey respondents, 94% of the companies’ financial statements were
reviewed by an accounting firm based on the second questionnaire that was asked.
Among the total of 126 respondents, only half of these companies maintain an
internal audit function.

In terms of changes in level of audit fee, amount of audit hours spent by
auditors and quality of audit provided by accounting firm, clients responded that
they experienced slight increases in all three of these elements after the SarbanesOxley Act. Based on the 5-scale measurement, the results were 2.43, 2.50, and
2.58 respectively.
After measuring the audit quality satisfaction, accounting firm knowledge
of the company’s internal control, industry, and suggestions, respondents are
satisfied with services that their accounting firms are providing. In the Central
New York region, the average accounting firm tenure with the client is about 13
years. The total audit fee ranged from $400 to $5,000,000 because of the
different size of companies; however, the average company spends $98,640 per
year for audit services. Total audit fees were significantly greater than other nonaudit services.

VII. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
I initially included the FSREV variable (if financial statements are not
audited by a public accounting firm, they are reviewed by an accounting firm)
when I developed the model. After running the regression analysis based on the
initial model, only 37 cases were used out of the 126 observations due to 89
missing cases for the FSREV variable. FSREV questionnaire does not apply to
participants whose financial statements are audited by a public accounting firm.
Participants who responded for the FSREV variable imply their financial
statements are not audited by a public accounting firm. Therefore, participants

accordingly responded to the FSREV questionnaire based on whether their
financial statements are reviewed by an accounting firm or not.
Table 5 below shows the relationship between each Y-variable and Xvariables. Among the clients audited by a public accounting firms, FSAPUB
(Financial statements audited by a public accounting firm), FSREV (financial
statements reviewed by an accounting firm), and 3BOOK (utilizing bookkeeping
service) are not included in the regression analysis because all values are 0 or
constant.
A. The Level of Audit Fee
As stated in hypothesis 1, the level of audit fee increased after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Survey participants responded that they experienced slight
increases of their audit fees for the last 5 years. The mean of the level of audit
fees category was 2.43 with the standard deviation of 0.77, which indicates a
slight increase in the level of audit fees. S&P 500 companies have experienced a
24% audit fee increase from 2002 to 2003 due to the enforcement of Section 404
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Foley and Lardner, 2005). Just like public companies,
these local private companies also experienced a small increase in the level of
audit fees. According to George Victor, chair of the NYSSCPA’s SEC Practice
Committee, accounting firms increase the bill because they realize the value of
the services that they provide to their clients.
Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the accounting firms could not increase
the fee because they were outbidding each other. Therefore, the competition
maintained or brought down the price of the audit. Nevertheless, the true value of

audit services is valued and private companies are under pressure to develop
internal controls similar to public companies. Companies need to accommodate
resources to enhance the internal controls. Therefore, private sectors experience
the spillover from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in public companies (Victor, 2005).
This research also found that among companies that are audited by public
accounting firms, as the level of fee increased, the quality of audit was enhanced.
Higher audit fees are related to the audit firms’ desire to maintain their reputation
(DeAngelo, 1981). Palmrose (1988) found that the larger accounting firms are
involved in less litigation compared to smaller audit firms. In addition, the
increase in audit fee is a result of better and updated technologies that lead to
more accurate audits (Wooten, 2003). Since private sector companies are
pressured to improve internal controls similar to public companies, it requires
auditors to spend more time and resources to test internal controls (Victor, 2005).
Unlike these companies with their financial statements audited by public
accounting firms, private companies that are not audited by a public accounting
firm show a negative relationship between LEVELAFEE (the level of audit fee)
and QUALITYA (the quality of audit). The decreases in audit fees bring the
concern of lower audit quality in response. Deis and Giroux (1992, 1996) found
from the governmental sector that the audit quality is higher for initial audit
engagement teams. In addition, as the number of bidders for the audit
engagement is higher, the audit quality increases (Copley and Doucet, 1993).
Finally, the research regression model found that LEVELAFEE and
CHANGE5YR (auditor changes within 5 years) have a negative relationship for

both participants that are audited and not audited by a public accounting firm.
Changing auditors is costly for clients. In order to compensate the costs in an
auditor change, audit firms lower the initial biddings. The companies are able to
maintain a lower audit fee by constantly changing auditors (Ettredge and
Greenberg, 1990). Clients that are small enough to hire a non-Big 4 auditors tend
to switch from Big 4 auditors to non-Big 4 firms (Ettredge, Li, Scholz, 2007). As
a result, the increases in audit fees are lower for companies that changed auditors
over the past five years compared to companies that did not change auditors.
Table 5 describes each variable that has an impact on the level of audit fee
changes and its relationship. Even though there were 74 companies audited by a
public accounting firm and 52 companies that are reviewed by an accounting
firm, only 70 and 37 samples are used respectively due to missing variables in the
responses.
TABLE 5
Level Audit Fee and Variables

Predictor
# of Observ
R-Sq
Constant
FSAPUB
FSREV
INTAUD
CHANGE5YR
AMTHRS
QUALITYA
SATWQUAL
0NONE
1TAX
2CONS
3BKKP

Audited by
a public acc firm
Coef
70
43.00%
1.3388
*
*
-0.0702
-0.0810
0.42552
0.1072
0.07634
-1.0839
-0.8510
0.1061
*

Reviewed by
an accounting firm
Coef
37
59.40%
1.365
-0.6598
1.0743
-0.5338
-1.0236
0.3880
-0.3807
0.1684
-0.9987
-0.8527
-0.2810
0.2555

4OTHER

-0.9852

0.2658

B. Audit Quality
In this study, among the companies whose financial statements are audited
by a public accounting firms, the quality of the audit is positively associated with
the LEVELAFEE and CHANGE5YR. DeAngelo (1981) proved that larger audit
firms have greater independence from their clients because each individual client
is immaterial. In addition to DeAngelo’s argument, independent research
conducted by Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato (2005) studied companies that
have changed their auditors after the Sarbanes-Oxley. These researchers
concluded that the increase in auditor independence resulted in an increase in
audit quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Just as these studies found in publicly
traded companies, private sector companies also experienced the same
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley: the level of audit fees increase the audit quality.
In addition to the audit fee, a change of audit firms within five years has a
positive relationship with audit quality. Myers and Omer (2003) researched the
relationship between auditors and clients in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act era. The
study addressed whether mandatory partner rotation of audit firms led to the
increase in audit quality and auditor tenure. Furthermore, it has been often found
that private companies tend to hire larger audit firms when they are at the stage of
an initial public offering (IPO). The private companies going public hire larger
accounting firms because larger audit firms are able to bear the risk, which
provides assurance to investors (Antle, 1982). Regardless of IPO concerns, in this
research, the changes in the audit firms within five years enhanced audit quality.

Contrary to DeAngelo’s argument that audit fee increases the level of
audit quality, DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) argued that
auditors sacrifice their independence in order to retain the client with a large audit
fees. Thus, audit fees become a potential influence on the auditor independence
because they create an economic bond. In this research, Defond, Raghunandan,
and Subramanyam’s finding was found among a group of companies that are not
audited by a public accounting firm. The responses indicated a negative
relationship between the quality of services and level of fees. Considering the
size of these private firms, their audit fees are not large enough to create an
economic bond with accounting firms. Therefore, as the fee goes down, the
quality of services increases among smaller companies.
Interesting research conducted by Detling (2004) found that changing the
auditor will lower the level of assurance because successor auditors need to gather
essential evidence. Detling found that the greater level of assurance needs a
higher level of evidence or a qualified auditor. Based on the fact that the
successor charges a lower fee than the predecessor, there is a potential that the
audit is not as complete or of as high a quality as the predecessor’s. In addition,
lowering audit fee will increase the risk in the client’s portfolio due to the fact that
the auditor will not test more or run a complete qualified audit in order to fit into
the low budget.
Due to the increase in audit fees as the consequence of the Section 404,
many clients that are feasible enough to be audited by Big 4 accounting firms tend
to change their auditors. These clients often hire a regional auditor to avoid an

additional premium charge (Ettredge, 2007). Among the survey participants,
about 24 participants, or 20% of the total participants, switched their accounting
firms within the last five years. One of the most common reasons was the recent
office relocation of PricewaterhouseCoopers in the Syracuse downtown area.
Eleven participants used to utilize the service provided by one of Big Four
companies, while thirteen of them hired non-Big Four audit firm. Among the 16
reasons provided for switching, three of these participants reduced the size of the
accounting firm, while four of them switched accounting firms to obtain greater
expertise or to expand the business. Even in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era, there
are some companies that changed to larger accounting firms due to the complexity
of the business. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether clients
downsized the accounting firms or not because the direction of change was not
asked in the questionnaire. A change of audit firm due to political or service
issues is difficult to measure in the direction of whether these participants hired
larger accounting firm or not.
Table 6 describes the change in audit quality and its relative variables. An
interesting observation in this case is the R-square of audited by a public
accounting firm is 25.6%, while the R-square of companies whose financial
statements are reviewed by an accounting firm is 62.10%. There is a significant
difference between the two samples. Since audit quality is subjective, the
difference between the two categories of respondents is not necessarily surprising.
TABLE 6
Audit Quality and Variables
Audited by

Reviewed by

Predictor
# of Observ
R-Sq
Constant
FSAPUB
FSREV
INTAUD
CHANGE5YR
AMTHRS
LEVELAFEE
SATWQUAL
0NONE
1TAX
2CONS
3BKKP
4OTHER

a public acc firm
Coef
70
25.60%
3.0816
*
*
-0.1173
0.1077
0.2059
0.1416
-0.1959
0.5115
0.2868
-0.0195
*
0.1250

an accounting firm
Coef
37
62.10%
3.455
-0.6119
0.8068
-0.2427
-1.4979
0.3690
-0.4861
-0.0159
-0.8647
-0.6510
-0.3199
-1.0662
0.0238

C. Client Satisfaction
The client satisfaction is positively associated with the audit firm’s
knowledge of the client’s internal control and valuable suggestions given to the
management team. As Carcello, Hermanson and McGrath (1992) found in their
research with Fortune 1000 companies, audit team and firm experience with the
client is one of the most important components that determines the quality of
audit and satisfaction. Other factors are industry expertise, audit firm
responsiveness to client needs such as responding in a timely manner and
compliance with general audit standards. Higher audit quality leads to a higher
client satisfaction. The research proves that client satisfaction with the audit team
is a positive attribute (Behn, Carcello, and Hermmanson, 1997). Service quality
is measured in five dimensions by Parasuraman (1988). These are
responsiveness, assurance, empathy, tangibles, and reliability. In addition to
Parasuraman’s measurement, a quality service includes the audit firm’s

knowledge of the client’s internal control and valuable suggestions to
management (Carcello, 1992). Therefore, a quality service provided by an
accounting firm will enhance client satisfaction.
In this research, the industry expertise and satisfaction have a negative
relationship, which is contrary to Carcello’s argument. Industry experts are
important for publicly traded companies because these experts not only provide
proficient knowledge, but also emphasize the reputation and firm’s image that is
important to external investors for a security purpose. The firm’s image is
influential to customer perception on the firm’s service and operations (Zeithaml
and Bitner, 2000). Nevertheless, these small local private companies have fewer
external investors and the accounting firm reputation is not as important so that
the industry expert is not valued as much.
Another interesting finding in this research is that client satisfaction and
audit firm tenure have a negative association. On average, the local companies
located in the Central New York region used the same accounting firm for 13.07
years. The number of years with an accounting firm ranged from 1 to 60 among
126 participants. The research finds that as the accounting firm’s tenure
decreases, client satisfaction goes up. Nevertheless, only 19% of these
participants changed their auditors within the five years after the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.
Client satisfaction and audit fee are highly interrelated, although previous
studies find differing results. Monroe and Grewal (1991) and Teas and Agarwal
(2000) found a negative relation between client satisfaction and audit fees, while

Peterson and Wilson (1985) concluded there is no relationship between the two
variables. However, in this research, regional companies have a positive
association between client satisfaction and the audit fee. Zeithaml and Bitner
(2000) stated that one of the most important aspects of service is the price of the
service. Higher price sets greater expectation of the audit quality so that clients
assume/expect a higher fee with higher audit quality.
Table 7 describes the relationship between client satisfaction and variables
that determines the factor. A high R-square shows that there is a strong
relationship in this data. This also means that 63.5% and 81.4% of the variations
in the data is explained by the model.
TABLE 7
Satisfaction and Variables
Audited by
a public acc firm
Predictor
Coef
# of Observ
70
R-Sq
63.50%
Constant
1.4998
FSAPUB
*
FSREV
*
INTAUD
-0.4312
YEARSACCFIRM -0.00090
CHANGE5YR
-0.2872
0NONE
0.5078
1TAX
0.7763
2CONS
0.4238
3BKKP
*
4OTHER
-0.7051
INTCONTRL
0.6029
INDUST
-0.0305
VALUSUGGEST
0.2017

VIII. Conclusion

Reviewed by
an accounting firm
Coef
37
81.40%
4.110
-0.1254
-0.470
-0.6096
-0.02703
-0.1028
-0.1114
0.0430
-0.3210
-0.2968
-0.4955
0.4790
-0.0464
0.2597

Since there are few studies that investigate the influence of the SarbanesOxley Act on regional firms, I decided to focus on finding associations between
(1) audit fees and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (2) audit fees, changes in auditors, and
the audit quality, and (3) the client satisfaction and the accounting firm’s audit
fee, knowledge of the client’s internal control and suggestions.
It is widely presumed that audit fees have increased for publicly traded
companies in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act era (Foley and Lardner, 2005). Just
like these public companies, small regional firms also experienced increases in
audit fees due to increases in the value of services. In addition to the increased
value of audit services, development of internal controls similar to public
companies contributed to the increase in the level of audit fees.
There are interrelated findings in audit fees, changes in auditors and the
audit quality. Among the survey participants, those who are audited by a public
accounting firm experienced an enhancement in audit quality with auditor
changes and increases in the level of audit fees. However, companies that use an
accounting firm to review their financial statements experienced the opposite
result. They experience an increase in audit quality as the level of audit fees
decreases.
A client’s satisfaction increases as the audit firm is more knowledgeable in
the client’s internal control and provides valuable suggestions to the management
team. Even though previous research proved that the industry specialists boost
client satisfaction (Carcello et al. 1992), in this research, there was a negative
relationship between industry specialists and client satisfaction. This may be due

to the fact that utilizing industry specialists requires a premium, and private
companies may not benefit from the higher cost of a specialist auditor.
One of the limitations of the current study is that the size of the participant
companies is not incorporated in the models. Many previous research studies
emphasize the importance of client size in terms of audit fees, etc. However, in
order to keep the confidentiality of survey participants, the size of client was not
asked in the questionnaire. Excluding the size of the client from the models may
limit the generalizability of the study.
Among the participants who terminated their auditors within the last five
years, if the direction of the auditor change were asked, the result could have been
more useful. Previous studies prove that many mid-size companies changed from
Big 4 accounting firm to local accounting firms in order to save the premium
charges (Antle, 1982). However, if smaller companies are planning an initial
public offering, they tend to switch their auditors from smaller accounting firms
to one of the Big Four firms for the reputation and risk bearing (Zeithaml and
Bitner, 2000). In this survey, there was a limitation of only asking the changes of
the auditors, not the direction.
Among the participants whose financial statements are reviewed by an
accounting firm, they have a negative relationship between client satisfaction and
the number of years spent with an accounting firm. It can be interpreted that the
frequent changes in an auditor will lead to a greater audit satisfaction. In future
research, looking into how often these clients change accounting firms might be
helpful in understanding how auditors changes help maintain audit satisfaction.
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Appendix
1. Are your financial statements audited by a public accounting firm? Yes No
(If yes, please skip to question #3)

2. If not, are your financial statements reviewed by an accounting firm? Yes No

3. Do you have an internal audit function?

Yes

No

4. Please choose the firm that serves your company:
_____ Beard Miller & Company
_____ Bowers & Company
_____ Dannible & McKee
_____ Deloitte & Touche
_____ Dermody, Burke & Brown

_____ Ernst & Young
_____ Fust Charles Chambers

_____ Firley, Moran, Freer & Eassa
_____ KPMG
_____ Piaker & Lyons
_____ PricewaterhouseCoopers
_____ Sirchia & Cuomo, LLP
_____ Testone Marshall & Discenza
Other: ____________________

_____ Green & Seifter

5. For how many years has the accounting firm audited your company? ________

6. If you changed an accounting firm within last 5 years:
a. Name of previous accounting firm _______________
b. Reason for change:

7. Considering the services provided by your accounting firm for the last 5 years,
a. The level of audit fees has:
Significantly
Increased

Slightly
Increased

Consistent
with inflation

Slightly
Decreased

Significantly
Decreased

b. The amount of audit hours spent by the firm:
Significantly

Slightly

Consistent

Slightly

Significantly

Increased

Increased

Decreased

Decreased

c. The quality of the audit provided by the accounting firm:
Significantly
Increased

Slightly
Increased

Remained about Slightly Significantly
the same
Decreased Decreased

8. Please indicate your satisfaction with the quality of the audit firm
Extremely
Dissatisfied
1

2

Extremely
Satisfied

Neutral
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

9. Is your company utilizing any other services from the accounting firm (circle
all that apply)?
None

Tax

Consulting

10. Total fees for fiscal 2007 Audit
Total fees for fiscal 2007 Tax
Total fees for fiscal 2007 Consulting
Total fees for fiscal 2007 Other

Bookkeeping

Other ______

$_______________
$_______________
$_______________
$_______________

11. The accounting firm is knowledgeable and familiar with your firm’s internal
control.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

12. The accounting firm is knowledgeable in your company’s industry.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

13. The accounting firm provided valuable suggestions to management.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

6

